President Hassan must turn citizens’ uprising against al Shabab terrorists into a nationwide offensive

By The Star Editorial Board

MOGADISHU – The recent extraordinary sight of government vehicles cruising on the deserted road linking Belet Weyne to Bula Burte after more than a decade of blockage by al Shabab terror group has warmed the hearts of many Somalis inside and outside the country.

The mafia turned that key road of about 120 kilometers into a hell, as part of its diabolic scheme to cut off towns and cities from one another to easily subjugate people living under its rule.

The anti-al Shabab uprising in Hiiraan, Gal Gaduud, Middle Shabelle and Bay regions by mostly untrained citizens with rusty guns, in sarongs and without boots or regular meals is indeed an inspiring development. It was a fluke that clan militiamen with no tactical gears notched stunning victories and retook dozens of villages and small towns from al Shabab’s well-trained fighters, who’re known for carrying out suicide attacks, abducting children, killing the elderly, destroying wells and falsely employing religion.

While citizens’ do-it-yourself spirit and their rejection of al Shabab’s ideology are commendable, yet any move that allows ordinary people to take the law into their own hands should be discouraged, as that’s a recipe for chaos and lawlessness in a country awash in weapons.

True, the uprising is a damning indictment of the national government’s failure to fulfill its cardinal duty of protecting its citizens. That there’s a necessity for clans to take up arms to defend themselves from al Shabab menace when there is a capable army in the country lays bare the bitter truth that ordinary citizens felt neglected by Hassan-Hamza administration.

But that shouldn’t be a pretext to do away with the role of the government, which ought to have the sole right to use force, or what is known as the monopoly on violence. Chasing militants out of towns and villages is the easy part. Holding them and providing services to the inhabitants in those areas are the hard part that only a national government can effectively deliver.

The popular revolt, still in its inchoate stage, must motivate the country’s top military brass to swing into action and broaden the war to end the scourge of terror. The limited nature of the operation speaks to the disunity between the national government and regional administrations, whose forces have not officially joined the campaign characterized by a clannish battle cry.

It’s high time the national government turned the citizens’ uprising into a coherent, nationwide offensive to eradicate al Shabab once and for all. Millions are virtually caged in their villages and towns and their movements are subject to the whims of the terror group’s leaders. In Bay and Bakol regions, for instance, the militants are so heartless that they even block hungry people from leaving areas under their control to seek humanitarian aid elsewhere. It’s the government’s responsibility to free them.

The national army, some of whom have started to help out the clan militiamen, can’t sit back and delegate its primary tasks to ordinary folks. Military operations are complex in their nature and mainly a result of a well-thought-out and well-resourced undertaking — not spontaneous, on-again, off-again affairs. Nor are the areas to liberate picked randomly. It’s a dereliction of duty and repugnant to the tradition of good governance to send untrained civilians to a war zone to fight a highly trained gang. That practice is utterly wrong and unnecessarily risky, no matter how you slice it.

The citizens-led operations have the potential to boomerang on the country. Already, ominous news have surfaced, with certain clans threatening to bar government officials from their areas if their interests are not taken care of. The recent disagreement between the army chief and a member of parliament over how to go about the drive to recapture El Buur and the mysterious death of the capital’s police chief accentuate the poor foundation of the operation and the urgent need for a clear, well-articulated and reliable military strategy that is acceptable to all shareholders. Letting clans do the job of the army has long-term security and political consequences. Armed clans usually pose a great danger to the rule of law and disarming them could take years.

The national army must be allowed to take charge of the operation against al Shabab to make the citizens’ initiative a sustainable military endeavor. The country has enough manpower – thanks to the admirable efforts of former President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmajo” – to root out al Shabab. The government can easily bring Somali soldiers in Eritrea — estimated to be more than 5,000 — back to the country to boost its fight against the misfits, who are now enormously enfeebled after Somalis in Ethiopia beat them back, a defeat that emboldened ordinary Somali citizens to rise up against their tormentors.

As the commander in chief of the armed forces, President Hasssan Sheikh Mohamud should take his responsibility seriously, stop his globetrotting and assume a lead role in managing the offensive. More, he must nudge regional leaders, who’re not on board, to sigh off on the new offensive. A nationwide command and control center must be set up to coordinate the now-ham-fisted efforts. A free-for-all, unregulated and clans-led offensive would weaken the very State that should be nurtured by all. Vengeful officials seeking to use the offensive as a means to settle scores with some clans must reined in. It will be a shame if the uprising morphs into a clan project and leads to territorial expansions by certain clans, or worse stirs up inter-clan conflicts.

Eradicating a criminal gang that is well-armed, well-financed and is in charge of rural parts of southern and central regions of the country requires a solid military strategy, resources and trained fighters – a daunting mission that the mainly rudderless, resource- and-materiel-strapped clan militiamen can’t mount. Al Shabab has been existing for so long not because it’s militarily superior to the national army or its fighters outnumber it, but because there was no political will and solid military strategy to eradicate the murderous group.

It’s unfortunate that the current administration seems to have learned little, if any, from the mistakes of its predecessors, whose shambolic, short-term strategies of fighting the group had borne no tangible fruits. Its lack of priority and incompetence border on the absurd. While it’s lavishly praising the bravery of the citizens’ push against the militants, its reluctance to take on those collecting, on behalf of the terror group, taxes from businesses and individuals in the capital, its seat, is incomprehensible.

President Hassan and Prime Minister Hamza Abdi Barre must first, and before they move on to other regions, deal decisively with al Shabab members in the capital, who hunt down government officials at will and set off explosives-laden cars anywhere in the city. Mogadishu’s security matters more than any other city in the nation. It’s the gateway to Somalia and its security reflects positively on other parts of the republic.

The recent plethora of public statements from the president, prime minister and attorney general warning that the government will target al Shabab’s money were reckless and largely hot air. Those officials should think better of it. Freezing and seizing terrorists’ resources need prudence and secrecy, not issuing empty rhetoric for public consumption. The habit of thinking aloud must be changed to an action-oriented one.

For their part, military leaders must be proactive and know that the ongoing operation will only have a real impact if it’s a part of a larger, comprehensive stabilization and recovery policy that encompasses the whole country. The initial success registered by untrained clan militiamen spoke volumes about the weakness of al Shabab’s fighters and their inability to withstand determined force. It also disclosed the dysfunction and the lack of vision by the leaders in the new administration in Mogadishu. Routing a hated group like al Shabab should be easy and done in a short period of time.

But the Somali government has to be cognizant of the fact that enemies of Somalia would not be excited to see Somalis achieving a quick victory over terrorists, founded by evil-doers working for foreign entities. Since al Shabab’s inception, the country has become a source of income – a cash cow, if you will – for many foreigners and their Somali enablers who benefit off the misery of the Somali people. There are about 20, 000, well-paid foreign soldiers and police officers from ten African countries. Hundreds of agents working for security firms are in the country, as well as an undisclosed number of soldiers from the US, the UK, Italy and others.

An equally critical issue to keep in mind is the notorious Halane enclave, a contributor to the insecurity in the country. The government must formulate an urgent policy on how it can close it in a few months’ time. The culture of tolerating Somali enemies ensconcing themselves in a green zone when the rest of the country is inhospitable must end. We shouldn’t normalize the insanity that is Halane. Somalia is not a jungle where foreigners can wander around and do whatever they fancy without regard for local rules and customs.

The process of closing Halane must include a plan to give each foreign embassy a land that is far away from the airport. Somali citizens, especially those in the capital, must be offered an opportunity to lead a normal life and not to suffer under the stratified standards that has divided their city into two worlds: A cesspool where Somalis’ lives are, to quote political philosopher Thomas Hobbes, “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” and the Elysian Fields where the lives of foreigners are well-protected from any harm.

The offensive against the militants mustn’t only be the beginning of the end of the terror group, but it must also be the beginning of a strong, peaceful and prosperous Somalia that is treated with respect by other countries and international organizations.